We analyze the advertising strategies of US presidential election campaigns during the 2020 primary cycle. We show how they leverage spatial targeting for ads on Facebook to achieve changing goals over the course of the primaries: from fundrasing at their respective home states, to shifting all the ad budgets to states with early primaries.
As corporations, academics, governments, and civil society discuss the right way to implement contact tracing apps, we noticed recurring implicit assumptions. The proposed solutions are designed for a world where Internet access and smartphone ownership are a given, people are willing and able to install these apps, and those who receive notifications about potential exposure to the virus have access to testing and can isolate safely. In this work we challenge these assumptions. We warn about the potential consequences of over-extending the existing state and corporate surveillance powers and describe a multitude of scenarios where contact tracing apps will not help regardless of access or policy. We call for a comprehensive and equitable policy response that prioritizes the needs of the most vulnerable, protects human rights, and considers long term impact instead of focusing on technology-first fixes.
Inferring transportation mode from smartphone sensors: Evaluating the potential of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth
We show that using information from pervasive Wi-Fi access points and Bluetooth devices can enhance GPS and geographic information to improve transportation detection on smartphones. Wi-Fi information also improves the identification of transportation mode and helps conserve battery since it is already collected by most mobile phones.
Following accusations of allowing discrimination on their ad platform, Facebook settled with the civil rights groups and agreed to introduce a number of changes to the platform. Among them, they introduced a tool called Special Audiences, that allows advertisers to reach users "similar" to their customers (or employees) but without considering age, gender, race, etc. In this report we show that simply not looking at these protected attributes doesn't change anything - the created audiences have nearly the same level of bias as the source audience.
We released the multi-layer temporal network connecting more than 700 students over a period of four weeks. The dataset was collected via smartphones as part of the Copenhagen Networks Study and it includes physical proximity, metadata for calls and text messages, as well as a static Facebook friendship graph, and gender information. My collaborators and I already published multiple papers based on the data, now we're happy to finally share it with the rest of the scientific community!
Political speech is paid, not free. On Facebook it also cost different amounts to advertise different political opinions to the same people. Showing liberal ads to conservatives (or conservative ads to liberals) can cost three times more than showing an "aligned" ad to the same audience. Further, when a political advertiser tries to show their ad to a broad audience, Facebook will show it predominantly to people who already agree with the message instead.
Most of research in discriminatory advertisting concerned abuse of targeting features: excluding Black and Latino people from seeing housing ads, excluding older workers from job ads, etc. In this work, we showed that even if the advertisers want to show their ads to a diverse audience, Facebook will preferentially present them to users who Facebook predicts to be more interested. As a result, women see different job ads than men (supermarket cashiers and janitors vs. AI specialists and lumberjacks), while white and Black people are presented with different housing opportunities.
Facebook does not only know the information you share in your profile or your browsing history. We find that on top of that Facebook has been buying information about more than 90% of their US users from data brokers. At least 40% of it (including financial information) is not at all accurate, potentially affecting not just the ads you see but also credit decisions, etc.
We interact with ranked lists everyday through web search results, job postings, or dating services. Arguably, a fair representation of a group (for example women among job applications) requires that this group gets enough attention as a whole. That attention depends both on where they are in the ranking and on how much of that ranking is actually seen. In this paper we model the interplay between these two factors.
Facebook nudged their users to enable two-factor autheticantion by providing their phone numbers "for additional security". In turn, the advertisers can now use this phone number to target these users with ads. Even if the users didn't enable their 2FA but went with the default option of using FB Messanger for text messagning - their phone number is now targetable. Worst of all - even if you never gave your phone number to Facebook for any reason but any one of your friends had your phone number in their phone book and allowed Facebook access - your phone number is now targetable.
Based on data collected from smartphones and Facebook, we find that for a big part of students academic performance of their friends is more predictive of their own performance than attendance is (but not for all of them, see our other paper). Showing up for classes consistently and not playing with phones during lectures are still most predictive individual features.
Humans have been shown to have fixed maxiumum capacity for the number of people they can maintain active ackquaintanceships with (because of mental, not time constraints) known as the "Dunbar number". In this work we show that such a capacity exists also for the number of active physical locations - for example, when you find a new restaurant, you tend to stop going to one of your previous favorites.
The spread of diseases follows a simple contagion model - everytime you're exposed to a virus or bacteria, there's a certain probability of getting sick. It has been hypothesised that spread of information and trends follows a complex contaigion model, in which you need multiple sources of exposure to pick it up. Using a coordinated group of Twitter bots we disseminated positive messages to real people and showed they are more likely to retweet our content if they're exposed to it from multiple sources compared to just being exposed multiple times from the same source.
We find it's possible to reliably infer whether two people are in close proximity by comparing which WiFi routers their phones see. At the time of writing, 80% of Android apps had access to the nearby WiFi routers at all times, posing a massive privacy risk.
Our other paper on predicting academic performance from individual behavior and social network shows that social ties are predictive of one's grades. In this paper we show that it's mostly the case for men (majority) in the dataset, but not for women (minority). Any machine learning algorithm by default optimizes for overal performance, and as an effect women get worse predictions than men. We suggest achieving parity through selecting such combinations of features that lead to a more balanced performance.
We observe population level differences between men and women in the Copenhagen Networks Study, especially with respect to their social networks: women are much more likely to be friends mostly with other women and, as a minority, are on the periphery of the university network.
We show that the distributions of distances and waiting times in between consecutive locations human mobility trances are best described by log-normal and gamma distributions, respectively, and that natural time-scales emerge from the regularity of human mobility.
Your smartphone scans for WiFi every couple of seconds, usually even if you disable it. In this paper we show that this data reveals clearly, second by second, whether you're stationary or in motion. Whole it sounds simplistic, the stop-location detection is used for many location-related analyses like extracting points of interest, transportation modes, schedules, etc.
We are moving towards using smartphones to trace proximity events that drive epidemic spreading. In this work we show that very low-level decisions about how often to detect contacts, and how to process the data has immense impact on the results of epidemic modeling. We use real Bluetooth data about proximity among 500 people.
We find that time series of WiFi scans contain a strong latent location signal. Because humans are very stable and repetitive in their mobility, each person spends the vast majority of their time next to just a few routers - knowing the location of these few, we can infer a persons location during most of the day These results reveal a great opportunity for using ubiquitous WiFi routers for high-resolution outdoor positioning, but also significant privacy implications of such side-channel location tracking.
The estimates of a phone's physical location is usually obtained using the Global Positioning System (GPS), or by calculated based on proximity of WiFi access points with known location. Most of the research regarding the creation of databases that hold locations of WiFi routers was based on data collected both artificially and over short periods of time (e.g., during a one-day drive around a city). In contrast, most in-use databases are collected by mobile devices automatically, and are maintained by large mobile OS providers. We address this situation using the deployment of over 800 mobile devices to real users over a 1.5 year period. We identify a number of challenges in using such data to build a WiFi localization database (e.g., mobility ofaccess points), and introduce techniques to mitigate them. We also explore the level of coverage needed to accurately estimate a user’s location, showing that only a small subset of the database is needed to achieve high accuracy.
Full publication list is available on my Google Scholar profile.